This paper takes a middle position on the ongoing debate in social theory between social constructionists and critical realists. Both accept that social structures are symbolically constructed and that they are real. They differ however on how they conceptualise the impact that structures have on social practices. Against social constructionists I argue that not only actors but also structures have causal powers. Against critical realists I argue that the causal powers of actors are different from those of structures; and that in order to understand how the two causalities relate to each other one has to focus on processes of intra and inter-action.
Introduction
It must be pointed at the very start that the terms used to define the de bate between social constructionists and critical realists are often mislead ing. They seem to imply that the differences between the two sides have to do with whether such phenomena as social structures are real or mere fictions in the minds of social scientists. In fact, the actual debate is concerned less with the 'reality' of structures than with how real social structures are con structed and what exactly they do, what kind of impact they have on social stability and change.
If we take, for instance, the exchange of views between Rom Harré and Bob Carter in a symposium published in the European Journal of Social Theory1 it is not only the critical realist Bob Carter who believes in the real existence of structures; Harré also states emphatically that social structures, although discursively constructed, are the real products of acting agents. They both, therefore, start by accepting, ontologically speaking, the real ex-istence of structures. They differ, however, on the way in which real struc tures impact on social action and interaction.
For Bob Carter (following Bhaskar 1978 , 1989 and Archer 2000 , social structures have 'causal powers', whereas for Harré only human agents have such powers. Social structures can in themselves cause nothing:
At the end of the day I hope to show that such referents [i.e. referents of social structure expressions -NM] are not the kind of entities that could be causally ef ficacious. I am not saying that there are no such things as social structures, but they are not the right kind of thing to do the sort of work that some people [i.e. the critical realists -NM] would like them to do (Harré 2002: 112) .
Some pages further on in the same text Harré makes his position clearer by arguing that if critical realists, when referring to social structures, were merely content with the notion 'of patterns that might emerge in the flow of discursive acts as constraints on the actions of individuals, we would hardly have a dispute' (Harré 2002: 147) . It is plain from the above that if not all, at least some constructionists are realists in the sense that they believe in the real existence of structures and more generally in the real existence of a sym bolically constructed social world.
This preliminary clearing of the ground will now allow us to focus on one of the key issues dividing the two opposing camps; the 'causal efficacy' of so cial structures. On this level I discern three positions, all of which seem to me problematic: a) the 'Harré thesis', which focuses on 'people' rather than 'structures' when reference is made to social causation; b) Giddens' structuration theory, which conflates agency and structure in a way that does not allow for the idea of actors being constrained to varied degrees by structures external to them; and c) Archer's critical-realist thesis, which in criticizing Giddens' conflationist strategy tries to distinguish 'the causal powers of people' from 'the causal powers of structures'.
However, the distinction of people as agents and roles/rules as means be comes problematic when Bourdieu's notion of the habitus (1977, 1990 ) is in troduced as a set of motor, cognitive, evaluative, generative schemata or dis positions which, in quasi-automatic fashion, are activated in specific social contexts. Bourdieu's habitus/dispositions are distinct from role structures (positions, in Bourdieu's terminology), as well as from what Harré calls peo ple's 'personal identities'. For Harré, personal identity refers to 'the basis of the individuality and uniqueness of existence of a single human being', whereas social identity refers to 'the type of role they (people, individuals) occupy or the job they do' (Harré 1993: 52) . Now Bourdieu's habitus as a set of dispositions is clearly distinct from both social-identity characteristics (since the latter are linked to role struc tures) and Harré's personal-identity characteristics (linked to the 'unique ness' of a human being). Dispositions as 'internalized social structures' (Bourdieu 1990: 54) are not unique but are shared by actors who have gone through similar socialization processes. In the light of the above, Harré's dis tinction of people as agents and role structures as means falls apart. Social actors are not only followers of rules/roles but also carriers of dispositions that are distinct from both the normative requirements of their roles and the unique features of their personal identity. To put it differently, the social games that people play do not only have a role/positional but also a disposi tional dimension -both dimensions being crucial for understanding the or derly or disorderly production of game outcomes. I shall make the above ar gument more concrete by using an example: the rugby game to which Harré refers (2002:114) .
In the course of a particular rugby match the players can carry on with the game only if they follow the basic normative expectations/rules entailed in their roles, which roles constitute the institutional structure of the game. This is to say that the rugby game has a role-institutional dimension (e.g. the specific rugby rules) which, on the paradigmatic level, players take into ac count when they play. As interpretative micro sociologists have pointed out, the basic norms or rules entailed in rugby roles, contra Parsons, are not, of course, followed by the players automatically, in puppet-like fashion. Players use rules creatively in their interaction with other players. But as Parsons (1957) has pointed out, rules, in the form of roles/normative expectations (the institutional structure of the game), are necessary prerequisites for the realization of the game as an ongoing social whole. The complete absence of such roles/norms would make the game impossible. Therefore, in this specific example, social causation (the realization and actualization of the game, the achievement of the players' aims such as scoring a goal) is inconceivable without the entailment of both actors and institutional structures.
The rugby game has not only a role /institutional but also a dispositional dimension. As already mentioned, each player unavoidably brings to it the set of generative schemata that Bourdieu calls habitus. These schemata (in so far as those involved are socialized in different class, educational, cultural contexts) vary from one player to another. In this way, understanding the 'actualization' or 'causation' of a specific game and its varied outcomes will have to take into account not only its institutional structure (the set of roles/rules it entails), but also the 'internalized social structures' that players carry within them (Bourdieu 1977: 80) .
To be more concrete, player A, given his/her specific dispositions (linked, let's say, to a middle-class upbringing) may adopt a more cautious, 'cerebral' approach to the game than player B, whose working-class socialization pre disposes him/her to a more impulsive or aggressive style. Now just as the game rules are not followed automatically but are strategically handled by the players as required by the situational interactive context, so are player's dispositions. Player B, given the coach's instructions or the reactions of team-mates, might try to control or attenuate his/her aggressive style.2 But the fact that an agent is not passive vis-à-vis either rules or his/her disposi tions does not mean that the game can be played without taking roles/rules and dispositions into account. To put this differently, institutional and dis positional structures are not mere means or tools but constitutive elements of social causation. To repeat: social causation necessarily entails both actors and structures; it is inconceivable without actors embodying dispositions as well as following institutionalized rules/norms (Mclver 1942) .
There is a third fundamental dimension of any social game (in so far as the latter is not solitary). As Harré, following the symbolic interactionist and ethnomethodological tradition (1993: 25) , has repeatedly pointed out, it is impossible to understand social reality in general, and social games in par ticular, without putting symbolic/discursive interaction at the center of the analysis. It is by means of the interactive dimension that one moves from the paradigmatic sphere (as a virtual order of rules and dispositions) to the syntagmatic one, the latter entailing the actualization of rules and dispositions in time and space (Mouzelis 1995: 104-8 ). As we have seen, players do not follow game rules or even their own dispositions in puppet-like fashion; they handle them in the light of the syntagmatically unfolding interactive process. To return to our rugby example, in response to an opponent's successful strategy a player (or a team) can adopt a counter-strategy actualizing alter native opportunities offered by the game's normative repertoire and/or the player's (or players') dispositional repertoire. In other words, the same player in different interactive situational conditions might handle both rules and his/her dispositions quite differently.
Finally, in the same way that a game's rule/role dimension entails institu tional structures (as well as the players' varied internalized dispositional structures), the interactive dimension entails relational or figurational struc tures.3 Here the elements or constitutive parts of structures are not rules/roles/institutions but agents; and the linkages between elemental parts are not logical/virtual (as in the case of institutional structures), but actual relations unfolding in time and space.4
So if institutional structures show us how in a specific game role A re lates to role B on the paradigmatic level (e.g. how, in football, the role of the goalkeeper relates to that of the centre-back), relational structures show us how a specific player, A, relates to player B (e.g. their actual relation may, within limits, be different from their normative one). This means that rela tional or figurational structures can vary independently from institutional structures. Moreover, the institutional structure of a game can allow for the emergence (on the syntagmatic level) of varied relational structures. For in stance, a team can adopt a strategy based on a centralized, 'authoritarian', star-dominated figuration of players, whereas the opposing team (or the same one on a different occasion) can opt for a participative, 'democratic' strategy leading to more decentralized relational arrangements.
A last point about the three dimensions of social games. Whereas institu tional and dispositional structures are constitutive elements of all 'socialcausation' processes, relational structures are not. For instance, in the pur suit of solitary games or sports (e.g. cycling, jogging etc.) we have only intra active processes; interactive processes leading to stable relational structures are absent, but institutional and dispositional structures (i.e. rules and the actors' habitus) are always, unavoidably present.
To conclude this section, Harré, in dealing with the social causation of such social phenomena as game outcomes takes into account the role/institutional and the discourse/interactive dimension. The fact that dis cursively interacting players are not only rule/norm followers but also dispo sition/habitus carriers is ignored. This underemphasis of internalized dispo sitional structures can be explained by the fact that Harré's constructionist predilections make him view any 'internal state of mind' as neo-Cartesian essentialism (Archer 2000: 89-117) . Therefore, dispositions as internalized so cial structures have no autonomy vis-à-vis role structures or discursive inter actions. This extreme anti-essentialist position, however, leads him to the er roneous conclusion that social causation entails only 'people' rather than, as I argue, people and structures (internalized and 'external' to specific actors).
GIDDENS' «INFLATIONIST STRATEGY
Although Giddens' structuration theory does not deal with the agencystructure relationship in the context of the realist-constructionist debate, there is no doubt that for him social causation entails both agency and struc ture. The way, however, that he brings together these two fundamental di mensions of social causation leads to a type of conflation that makes it im possible to theorize degrees of 'distance' or 'external constraint' between ac tors and structures.
Giddens, influenced by linguistic structuralism, conceptualizes structures as rules and resources existing on a virtual plane (paradigmatic dimension); they are actualized, 'instantiated' when people draw on them in order to act or interact in time/space (syntagmatic dimension). In the above sense, struc ture is both means and outcome. It is means in that subjects use it to carry on with their daily activities, and it is outcome because each time rules and resources are actualized they are reproduced (Giddens 1984: 169-71) .
It is on the basis of this conceptualization that Giddens rejects the agency-structure dualism that is so common in conventional sociological analysis -a dualism which leads the researcher to view actors as being con strained by structures external to them. For the author of structuration the ory the actor-structure linkage entails not dualism but duality. It entails the elimination of any 'externality', any distance between actor and structure. Structure as both means (subjective dimension) and outcome (objective di mension) is 'internal' to the actor; it constitutes the two sides of the same coin. In this way the duality-of-structure schema helps us to understand the process of structuration that links structure (as a virtual order of rules and resources on the paradigmatic level) with the social system (as a set of pat terned interactions on the syntagmatic level) (Giddens 1984: 376) .
Although Giddens himself does not do so, we may easily equate structura tion here with the social-causation process. It is via structuration that the production and reproduction of social systems is 'caused' or actualized/'instantiated'. To take a concrete example again, institutional wholes such as rugby rules are reproduced via the duality of structure: via the fact that thousands of individual players in a routine, taken-for-granted manner use rugby rules to play their regular game. Each time they do so they repro duce and therefore strengthen this particular institutional complex.
This way of linking actors to structures is highly problematic however. It fails to consider that actors are capable of relating to rules not only in a practical, taken-for-granted fashion but also theoretically and/or strategi cally. To put it in Giddens' terminology, actors can and do relate to rules not only in terms of duality but also in terms of dualism. Very frequently actors take distance from structures (i.e. rules and resources) in order to acquire theoretical knowledge of them, or in order to construct strategies for chang ing or defending specific rules. Whether we look at rugby or any other insti tutionalized rules, these institutional complexes are not only reproduced, as implied in Giddens' structuration theory, via the actor-structure duality schema -i.e. by the fact that millions of laypersons, in taken-for-granted manner, use such rules in their everyday existence. They are also reproduced via agents (usually powerful 'macro' actors) who take distance from them in order to study, transform, or defend the institutional complex to which these rules belong (Mouzelis 1995:119-24) .
Rugby rules, for instance, are studied by sociologists of sport. They are also the objects of strategic interventions by 'reformers' who want to change them in a 'civilizing' direction, or by traditionalists who want to maintain the status quo (Dunning and Rojek 1992; Dunning and Sheard 1979) . There fore, an explanation of the constitution, reproduction, and transformation of rugby rules must take into account both the relevant agents' taken-forgranted, practical routine orientation to the rules (the duality-of-structure mode), and those orientations that have a theoretical and/or strategic intent (the dualism mode).
To conclude, it is one thing to argue that social causation entails both agency and structure, and quite another to conflate the two in a way that ex cludes the possibility of conceptualizing agents as taking distance from structures (as rules) in thei* attempt to understand them better, to change them, or to defend the status quo. Because Giddens' structuration theory eliminates the above possibility, it fails to give us a convincing account of how, in actual social contexts, institutionalized structures are created, re produced, or transformed. It is not therefore surprising that Giddens' struc turation theory is incompatible with certain aspects of his work (for exam ple, his theory of reflexive modernization) which focus on the capacity of agents for reflexivity and for theoretical knowledge of rules (Parker 2000) .
ARCHER'S ANTI-CONFLATIONIST STRATEGY
Margaret Archer starts by rejecting Giddens' conceptualization of struc ture. She argues that Giddens conflates agency and structure in such a way that it is impossible to deal with the fundamental problem of structural con straints/enablements, and with the obvious existence of varying degrees of constraint and freedom. Because of this structures portray no 'externality', no properties that make them distinct from those of actors/people. It is be cause of this conflation that Giddens cannot deal in theoretically congruent manner with the familiar notion that people tend to create social arrange ments which were not anticipated and which frequently evade their control (Archer 1982 (Archer , 1990 (Archer , 2000 .
a) From structuration to morphogenesis
Archer puts historical time at the center of her analysis. What she calls morphogenesis entails an initial stage, tl, where interacting agents, in pur suing their own preferences and interests, create systems (social and cultural structures) which, beyond a certain developmental threshold, t2, acquire properties and powers distinct from those of their initial creators. 'Cultural and structural emergent properties are held to have temporal priority, rela tive autonomy and causal efficacy vis-à-vis members of society' (Archer 2003: 2) . Therefore the move from tl to t2 is a process of structural elabora tion and emergence which leads (at least analytically) to a clear separation of agency and structure, a separation between actor's emergent properties' and a system's emergent properties ('structural emergent properties' and 'cultural emergent properties') (Archer 1982) .5
Systemic emergent properties condition, but do not entirely determine social practices. Contra Althusser, actors in the morphogenetic process are not mere 'carriers of structures'. In this way the reification of structures is avoided, as is its extreme opposite seen in the interpretative microsociological tradition: the reduction of structures to the interactive processes between laypersons. M. Archer seeks, therefore to avoid three types of reductionism: -'downward' reductionism (the reification of structures); -'upward' reductionism (the reduction of structure to interaction); -'middle' reductionism (Giddens' conflation of agency and structure (2000: 5-10)).
b) A critique of morphogenesis
In Archer's writings, structures are relatively autonomous from agents in two different ways.
1. In contrast to social constructionism, social structures have a reality that is not entirely based on or exhausted by discourse. Following the Marxist tradition Archer believes that there is, or might be, a discrep ancy between, for instance, actual structures of domination or exploi tation and people's perceptions, discourses, beliefs about them. Since structures pertain not merely to a discursive but also to a 'practical' world (Archer 2000: 154-93) , they can have an impact on social prac tices, irrespective of whether people do or do not talk, know or do not know about them. 2. Social structures portray characteristics or properties different from those of actors. For instance, one can clearly distinguish the structural characteristics of a role from the way an actor, having been socialized in a specific way, handles the role's normative expectations. Therefore, the features of an institutional role structure are not only real but also different from the features of the actors who play them. To use the dis tinction I developed in section 2, a social game has a positional/role dimension that is distinct from and irreducible to the dispositional and/or the action-interaction dimension. It is at this point that Archer's anti-conflationist strategy becomes prob lematic. Archer is right in distinguishing actors' causal powers from those of structures. She is also right in pointing out that actors, analytically speak ing, have different properties from those of structures -i.e. that structures are independent from agents in the sense of (1) and (2) above. There are two problems with her morphogenetic approach, however:
-She fails to point out that the 'externality' of structures is a function not only of historical time but also of hierarchically organized social space. -In linking, in her recent work (Archer 2003) , the causal powers of people with those of structures she overemphasizes intra-action (the 'internal conversation' of actors) and underemphasizes interaction (the 'external conversation' among actors). When Archer tries to avoid agency-structure conflation by introducing a time-historical dimension into her analysis, the system created by agents in tl eventually reaches a certain threshold in t2 and acquires autonomy from the initial creators. This autonomy expresses 'unanticipated consequences' and/or the inability of the initial actors to control or shape the structural emergent in t2 in a way that will make it compatible with their own prefe rences and interests. When assessing the structure's autonomy from agents it is not enough, however, to focus on the linkage between the initial creators at tl and the emergent structural product at t2. One should further consider how structure at t2 links up with sets of interacting agents also at t2 -inter acting agents who may be different to but are also related to the 'initial crea tors'.
Let me illustrate this point by taking a classical example of the 'unantici pated-consequences' syndrome: Moore's (1967) analysis of the peasantry's role in the creation of post-traditional, modern political structures. He has argued, very convincingly I think, that peasants played a crucial role in the shaping of early modernity. Whether one looks at the bourgeois democratic, the fascist, or the communist route to the creation of modern political insti tutions, peasant mobilization was at the center of the revolutionary process that destroyed the ancien régime of the societies Moore examined. On the other hand, in stark contrast to peasants' expectations and hopes, the insti tutional structures that eventually emerged out of the various revolutionary struggles were inimical to peasant interests. In England, Germany, Russia, and China it was always the rural producers who were the major victims of the modernization process.
In terms of Archer's morphogenetic paradigm, therefore, in tl we have actors (more or less 'corporate') whose intra-and inter-class interactions led in t2 to an emergent system that was 'autonomous' from its initial creators by portraying features (e.g. the distribution of resources between rural and urban elites, etc.) incompatible with the rural cultivators' interests and hardly changeable or manipulate by them. Now it is important to note that if the emergent modern institutional structures acquired a high degree of autonomy from the peasants who contributed considerably to their creation, they portrayed a lesser autonomy vis-à-vis non-peasant collective actors who were more successful in creating (intentionally or not) structural outcomes more in line with their own interests. In the English and French cases, for in stance, what B. Moore calls bourgeois classes were in this more fortunate po sition. To put it in Archers' terminology, in t2 the emergent system of mod ernity was more autonomous vis-à-vis the dominated, peripheralized peas antry and much less so with regard to the dominant bourgeoisie. In t2, rural cultivators play a lesser role in the reproduction and management of modern political structures than do the bourgeois classes: the post-revolutionary, post ancien régime structures were less manipulate from the point of view of the rural 'losers' and more manipulate, less autonomous from the point of view of the urban 'winners'.
If the above macro-historical example, with its references to classes as collective actors seems too vague, the same point can be made by looking more modestly at a formal organization such as a business enterprise, focus ing for simplicity's sake on institutional structures. The manager of the sales department -in pursuing the desired goal of increasing sales -is faced with both manipulable/changeable and non-manipulable rules. The latter may consist for example of a strict prohibition about pursuing sales tactics that would undermine the status or performance of other departments. Within the limits created by such rules that the sales manager is unable to change, s/he can choose from a repertoire of institutionalized sales techniques (which are the manipulable structural features of the situation) such as door-to-door promotion, television advertising, increasing sales via price reductions, etc. Now, always in relation to the realization of the same goal, let us consider a hierarchically superior manager who, unlike the subordinate one, does have the power to change the present balance between departments by allocating more resources to sales and less to production or research and development.
In that case what was non-manipulable for the sales manager becomes ma nipulable for his or her superior. The articulation between changeable and non-changeable structural features, between 'means' and 'conditions' in Parsonian terminology,6 changes as we move up the corporation's formal or in formal power hierarchy.
This perspectival approach, which leads to the serious consideration of not only historical time but also hierarchized space, is missing from Archer's morphogenetic model. Her emphasis on the historical-time dimension is at the expense of that of social space. When she examines the agency-structure relationship, she constantly refers in undifferentiated manner to the actor(s), not to interacting actors or to hierarchically-placed actors.
c) Perspectiv al or methodological dualism
Let me at this point bring together the various threads of my argument against morphogenesis, by putting forward a somewhat different account of agency-structure linkage, an account based on what one may call perspectival dualism.
As I mentioned in Section 1, all non-solitary games entail actors as well as three types of structure: internalized dispositional structures (Bourdieu's habitus), institutional structures (sets of interrelated norms/roles), relational or figurational structures (sets of interrelated actors). All structures entail features, some of which are and some of which are not manipulable by situ ated actors.7 From this perspective the externality of structures must be seen within a space-time matrix.
Externality in terms of historical time
To begin with we have the distinction between internalized/dispositional structures and structures more external to a specific situated actor (institu tional and figurational structures). Whereas the first are part and parcel of an agent's socio-psychological make-up, the latter are 'external' in two ways:
(i) In terms of 'unintended consequences'. As Archer has argued, interact ing actors may produce structural outcomes that acquire autonomy from their creators, in the sense that the latter have not intended them and/or cannot at a subsequent stage control the emergent properties of such outcomes. (ii) In terms of the existence of social structures, before an actor enters the context that entails them, and after s/he leaves this context. For instance, the role structure of the rugby game existed before a specific actor be came a player and remains after s/he ceased to play the game. Needless to say, externality of social structures in terms of (i) and (ii) does not mean that such structures are external to or autonomous from all actors. They are external or relatively autonomous from specific actors oper ating in specific space-time contexts.
Externality in terms of hierarchized space
If we bracket the time dimension in order to focus on hierarchically or ganized social space, we have to take into account that agent X, in pursuing specific goals, is faced with external institutional and figurational structures which, from his/her perspective, present a mix of manipulate and nonmanipulable features or properties. This structural mix is both real and ex ternal to agent X. But despite this reality and externality, structural features change from the perspective of a more powerful agent Y who is also involved in the same space-time matrix. For actor Y, the structural mix of changeable and non-changeable features is transformed: what was non-changeable for X becomes changeable for Y.
It is precisely this type of variability that Archer does not take seriously into account. In so far as she underemphasizes it, she ascribes to the proper ties of structures a fixity, anjntransitivity which they do not possess. This underemphasis leads to a partial hypostasization and reification of struc tural features, since the relation between agent and structure is examined in a hierarchic vacuum.8 I call the above approach, which tries to establish the relative autonomy of structures vis à vis actors, perspectival or methodological dualism in order to distinguish it from philosophical or ontological dualism -the latter imply ing that the autonomy of structures from actors has not only a methodologi cal but also an ontological basis. Contra Archer and Bhaskar I think it is preferable to bracket the philosophical/ontological issue of whether actors and structures constitute one or two distinct realities and simply stress that it is methodologically useful:
-to avoid the actor-structure conflation which aims at the transcendence of the subjectivist-objectivist divide -to avoid reducing structures to actors or vice versa -to view social reality or social practices both from an actor's 'internal ist' perspective and from a system's 'externalist' one. Ignoring the for mer leads to essentialism and ignoring the latter leads to various forms of reductionism.9
ARTICULATION OF AGENTIC AND STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES
In Being Human (2000) Archer, as already mentioned, differentiates the causal powers of structures from those of people -but in doing so she says very little about how the two causalities articulate to produce actual prac tices. In Structure, Agency, and the Internal Conversation she clearly admits this omission: a) The internal conversation M. Archer tries to fill the gap, so to speak, by pointing out that the miss ing link between structural and agentic causality is the reflexive process of 'internal conversation'. Actors have to face external situations that entail real structural and cultural constraints and enablements. The way, however, in which these constraints and enablements impinge on an actor depends on his/her internal dialogue. In the light of her/his major concerns, the actor will try to find what course of action to take. More specifically, through a proc ess of 'internal turn-taking' in which there is continuous intra-action be tween an 'objective' and a 'subjective' self, the actor tries to discern the pos sible courses of action the situation offers; and then deliberates on the advan tages or benefits and disadvantages or costs of each of them. Finally, as a re sult of such 'thought experiments', a mental balance sheet is drawn up on the basis of which the actor makes a decision that may or may not consist of ac tivating the constraints and/or enablements the situation offers (this third phase Archer calls dedication). The actor may also change his/her mind about the decision taken -in which case the agentic processes of discern ment, deliberation, dedication, ('the 3 Ds') start all over again.
Archer stresses that 'people with different identities will evaluate the same situations quite differently and their responses will vary accordingly ' (2003: 139) . This does not mean, however, that one should conflate the situa-tion with the ways in which actors perceive, evaluate, and/or respond to it. Contra social constructionism, Archer rightly points out that the situation, as objectively shaped by cultural and structural enablements/constraints, constitutes an objective reality and, as such, should be clearly distinguished from the varied ways in which actors view it: 
b) Three types of reflexivity
In Structure, Agency, and the Internal Conversation M. Archer tries to account systematically for the actors' different responses to the constraints and enablements with which their situation presents them by constructing, on the base of a series of in-depth interviews, a three-fold typology of reflex ive conduct: communicative, autonomous, and the meta-reflexive.
The communicative-reflexive individual portrays a type of internal dia logue that gives priority to stable personal relationships in the family, neighbourhood, and local community, and so avoids projects that undermine this kind of social arrangements. In Archer's terminology, the communica tive-reflexive person will not activate but rather evades enablements and constraints entailing geographical and/or social mobility, being content to 'stay put'. The autonomous-reflexive, on the other hand, emphasizes in his/her internal deliberations goal achievement rather than maintenance of stable personal relationships. Instead therefore of evading, s/he activates constraints and enablements, trying to diminish the former and strengthen the latter. Finally the meta-reflexive's internal dialogue is shaped by the fact that s/he is permanently critical of both the self and the external situation. As a result s/he is engaged in an internal process of continuous subversion, moving from one situation to the next -in this way diminishing the chances for both upward mobility and for stable social relationships.
c) Some critical comments
In so far as social realists stress more how actual structures condition agents, rather than how agents handle structural constraints and enable ments, there is no doubt that Archer's theorization of the internal conversa tion as a reflexive mechanism linking the causal powers of actors and those of structures constitutes a definitive advance. Her recent theory presents some further difficulties, however.
The externality and internality of enablements /constraints
The first difficulty has to do with the fact that the actor must face not only external but also internal constraints and enablements. Following Bourdieu (1990) , the dispositions the subject carries are 'internalized social structures' and the result of his/her previous socializations. The French soci ologist thinks that in normal conditions such dispositions operate quasiautomatically: the actor mobilizes his/her habitus in non-reflexive manner in order to act in a specific field. It is only when these dispositions clash with a field's positions that 'internal' reflexivity comes into play.
I think that Bourdieu in this context is wrong. An actor evinces signifi cant degrees of reflexivity irrespective of whether there is compatibility or incomparability between dispositions and positions. If certain dispositions are quasi-unconscious (e.g. how one perceives certain objects), others are certainly conscious and can be manipulated by their carriers (e.g. table man ners. See Sweetmann 2003:536) In such cases the actor, by discerning, delib erating, and eventually committing him/herself to a certain course of action activates not only external but also internal constraints and enablements. To use J. Alexander's terminology, actors are constantly confronted with both external and internal environments of action. Both internal and external en vironments create opportunities and limitations for situated subjects (Alex ander 1998: 214ff).
Interaction as a second mediating mechanism between agency and structure
Archer not only neglects internalized constraints/enablements, she equally fails to take seriously into account that the structure-agency mediat ing mechanisms are not only internal but external as well. In other words, we
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have not only internai but also 'external conversations', intra-active as well as interactive processes which, by activating constraints and enablements, link structure with agency (see Craib 1998: 4ff) If J. Alexander's work helps us to distinguish internal from external envi ronments of action, Joas' Creativity of Action (1996) helps us realize the ex tent to which interaction is central for understanding how agents relate to external structural limitations and possibilities. According to Joas, while ra tional-choice theory emphasizes the utilitarian dimension of social action and Parsons the normative, they both neglect a third, creative dimension. The reason for this is that both, though in very different ways, fail to realize what a crucial role interaction plays in the production of social practices.
For the author of the Creativity of Action, whether one considers the utilitarian means-end schemata of the rational-choice approach, oi the va lues, normative requirements and internalized needs/dispositions of Parsonian functionalism, both models give us a very static view of social reality. They do not consider sufficiently that means and goals, values and norms are in constant flux, in constant negotiation as interacting actors attempt to cope with each other's strategies and counter-strategies. To take goals as an example: even when they do not emerge within the interactive situation (be ing given in advance), they change as the interactive process unfolds and as the actors try to adapt and readapt means to ever-changing ends. As sym bolic interact ion ists and ethnomethodologists have pointed out, the interac tive situation presents actors with problems whose solution has to be in vented in the here and now. What I would add to Joas' argument is that, as Archer has convincingly shown, it is not only the interactive but also the intra-active situation that has to be taken into account in exploring the creativity of action. If plans and projects, norms, values etc. are constantly negotiated, this is due not only to interactive but also to intra-active processes. Both must be granted full consideration if we wish to understand the problem-solving dimension of
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social conduct. Both processes contribute to the 'invention' of solutions to the problems constantly generated by social intercourse.
Linking agency and structure
With the conceptual tools Alexander and Joas offer us it is possible, I think, both to distinguish more precisely the difference between the causal powers of people and of structures, and to show how the two causalities ar ticulate with each other. Concerning structure, this refers to cultural, institu tional, figurational, and internalized dispositional environments of action that provide limits and opportunities for situated subjects. Concerning agency (to use Archer's terminology), this entails processes of discernment, deliberation, and dedication (2003:102-3) that activate or 'deactivate' inter nal and external constraints and enablements. What links the two causalities, what makes them a unitary process, is the continuous flow of intra-and in teraction, of internal and external 'conversations' that lead to specific deci sions and to practical outcomes.
If this conceptual framework is accepted, a major task for an anti conflation ist, 'agency-structure' theory would be to explore the connections between intra-and interaction. If, for instance, 'autonomous reflexivity' en tails a highly disciplined, strict relationship of the 'subject self with the 'ob ject self, does this lead to a similarly disciplined and strict relationship be tween the agent and his/her children or colleagues? Is it possible to be strict with oneself and highly indulgent of one's children, spouse, or neighbours? What are the conditions when there is symmetry or homology between intraand interaction, and when are intra-and interaction asymmetrical?
Questions like this, crucial for understanding agency-structure linkages, are not being asked in Archer's work. I think the main reason for this is that the interactive dimension plays a rather subsidiary role in her conceptual framework. This marked peripheralization of interaction in her earlier writ ings (1982, 1990, 2000) takes the form of neglecting the social space of hier archically-placed interacting agents; in her more recent work (2003) it shows itself by the overemphasis of intra-action and underemphasis of interaction as the mediating mechanisms between agency and structure.10 6. Conclusion a) Cultural, institutional, and figurational structures entail constraints and enablements that are real and external to situated actors. Contra social constructionism, the 'externality' thesis does not lead to a reification of structures if actors are located within a space-time matrix: -in terms of historical time, as Archer's morphogenetic theory states, actors may produce structural outcomes that subsequently acquire autonomy from them (via the emergence of unintended consequences or other mechanisms). The same autonomy/externality obtains when ever the structures (cultural, institutional, figurational) of a social whole exist before an agent's entrance into it, and may persist after her/his exit. -in terms of hierarchized social space, following what I have termed methodological or perspectival dualism, what is external/autonomous for an actor who can only mobilize meagre resources, can be less ex ternal/autonomous for one who, when involved in the same context or game, is able to mobilize more resources. Therefore, the 'externality' of structures is a function not only of historical time (e.g. the emergence of 'uncontrollable' structural outcomes as we move from tl to t2), but also of hierarchized social space (e.g. non-manipulability of a game's structures as we move from 'high' to 'low' hierarchical positions). b) Both Harré and Archer, for different reasons, do not sufficiently take into account the dispositional dimension of social games: the fact that actors are carriers of internalized structures that present them with internal constraints and enablements. Harré, because of his extreme antiessentialism, does not allow for any autonomy of dispositional structures from ongoing discursive interactions. Archer on the other hand under emphasizes dispositions because, for her, structural constraints/ enable ments are always external to the actor. c) Archer, contra Giddens' conflationist strategy, rightly points out that people's causal powers are distinct from those of structures (analytical dualism). However, whereas in her early work she does not show how the two causalities are linked, in her late work she focuses only on intra active mediating mechanisms (on the 'internal conversation' of agents). She does not, therefore, seriously consider the interactive dimension (i.e.
'external' conversations) as the other major mediating link between agency and structure. d) The structure-agency controversy can be settled neither by conflating à la Giddens the two dimensions, nor by examining the linkages between agents and structures in a hierarchical vacuum. The neglect of interac tions between hierarchically placed agents, i.e. the neglect of the fact that social outcomes result from the strategies of interacting actors who often possess different amounts of economic, political, social, or symbolic capi tal leads either to reductionism, or to the partial hypostatization of struc tures. If social constructionists, as Archer has pointed out, tend to reduce structures to the discursive practices of interacting agents, social realists, by neglecting the hierarchical dimension of social life, ascribe to social structures a fixity which they do not possess -and in that respect reify them.11
The necessary preconditions for a theoretically congruent linkage of agency to structure are:
-to bracket the philosophical/ontological issue of dualism and to stress more methodological or perspectival dualism -to distinguish clearly between the external and internal environments of action (i.e. between external and internal structural constraints/enable ments actors have to face); -to stress, contra Giddens, that actors can relate to structures (internal and external) both in a taken-for-granted (duality) and in a more re flexive, strategic manner (dualism); -to see both intra-and interaction as mediating mechanisms between agen de and structural causal powers; -to relate social structures not to 'the actor' or 'actors', but to hierarchi cally placed interacting actors (past and present). In brief: social causation as a unitary process entails the articulation via mediating mechanisms of intra-and interaction, of the causal powers of agents (discernment, deliberation, dedication) and those of structures (inter nal and external constraints/enablements).
7. To take institutional structures as an example, an ordinary player has to accept the basic rules of the game as unchangeable, non-manipulable. Within the limits imposed by the basic rules there is a repertoire of techniques from which the player can choose -these techniques constituting the structure's manipulate features. The same is true about figurational struc tures. From the point of view of a specific player, certain relational arrangements are change able whereas other are not.
8. Realists argue that the distinction between agentic and structural powers is only analytic (analytic dualism). Still, one has to show how the two types of causal powers articulate with each other. As I shall argue in Section 5, Archer in her early work has failed to establish any linkages between the two causalities. In her more recent work (2003) there are serious problems with the way in which such linkages are conceptualized.
9. Anthony King (1999) criticized Archer's ontological dualism by arguing that there are not two distinct realities (actors and structures) but one: people past and present and their in terrelationships. I think that the shift from methodology to ontology creates more problems than it solves. If one is interested in the type of theory which provides conceptual tools (Gener alities II in Althusserian terminology) useful for the empirical exploration of the social world, one should stress methodological rather than ontological dualism or monism.
To be more specific: it is much less important to decide whether structures constitute a re ality different from actors; and more to stress, that actors' causal powers (in the form of a sub ject's decision-making, agentic powers) is different from structural causality which takes the form of constraints and enablements that an actor faces in specific social contexts.
Finally, I think that a more useful distinction, as far as different social 'realities' are con cerned, is that between virtual realities on the paradigmatic level (e.g. relations between rules) and actual or 'instiatiated' realities on thesyntagmatic level (e.g. relations between actors). For the argument that social theory should focus less on epistemological (as in the '70s and '80s) or ontological issues (as in the '90s onwards) and more on methodological ones see Mouzelis 1991. 10.1 shall try to make the above critical point more specific by taking an example from Archer's Agency, Structure and the Internal Conversation. In this book (which, as already men tioned, is based on a number of in-depth interviews), one of the subjects questioned was Eliot Wilson: a former university lecturer who changed career in mid-course by moving from acade mia to the antiquarian book trade, an activity he performs solo from his home. Archer, quite correctly, classified him as typically 'autonomous-reflexive' who portrays such typical features as contextual discontinuity (moving from one career to another), thinking and making up his mind on his own, flexible and accommodative ethics of fairness and decency vis-à-vis family and friends, etc.
In deciding to move from the academic to the antiquarian field, Eliot had to consider not only the, to him, 'external' environments of action (e.g. the institutional/role structure of the university, the figuration of the organization's power relationship, the culture and philosophy of the teaching profession, etc.), but also his own internalized dispositional environment of ac tion -an environment which also presents the actor with enablements/constraints. For in stance, Archer tells us that, before taking up the antiquarian book trade, Eliot taught first at Oxbridge and then moved to a red-brick university. It is not clear from Archer's account whether Eliot simply disliked teaching and the academic environment, or whether he made the move to the antiquarian book trade because of failure to move up in the academic hierarchy. If the latter is true, his decision to change career might be related to dispositions such as cogni tive schemata inimical to abstract thinking, or emotive schemata encouraging aloofness, rather than the kind of sociability entailed in teaching. This type of dispositions or habitus constitutes fnimm/.constraints/enablements which, together with the external ones (related to the univer sity's cultural, institutional and figurational structures), are always taken into account by agents trying to make up their minds about a radical change in their life course.
Archer rightly points out that 'The lives of 'autonomous reflexives' tend to move through a variety of modi vivendi as a result of learning about themselves and their society, whilst also coping with the inevitable quota of intervening contingencies ' (2003: 244) .
Learning about oneself means of course being reflexive about one's own dispositions. It means taking into account the internalized constraints and opportunities of our dispositional make-up.
Another point it is important to stress here is that being autonomous-reflexive does not mean that only intra-active processes mediate between agency and structure. Unless one is au tistic, interactive as well as intra-active mechanisms will always mediate between agentic ca pacities and structural constraints/enablements. Moreover, this is true whether one considers macro or micro time. Whether one looks at long-term processes leading to decisions fundamen tal for one's life-course or at routine, day-to-day ones, both intra-and interactions, internal and external conversations mediate between agency and structure. This is too obvious to need fur ther development.
11. For another kind of intermediate position between realism and constructionism see Burkitt, 1999 : 88ff. Sayer (1997 distinguishes between strong/unacceptable and weak/accept able forms of constructionism. I think that, in the light of my critique of Archer, one can make a similar distinction between weak/legitimate and strong/methodologically illegitimate forms of realism.
